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Abstract. Some aspects of Federigo Enriques mathematical philosophy thought are taken as 
central reference points for a critical historic-epistemological comparison between it and some 
of the main aspects of the thought of other his contemporary thinkers like Gaston Bachelard 
and Hermann Weyl. From what will be exposed, it will be also possible descry eventual 
educational implications of the historic-epistemological approach. 
1. Introduction 
 
Even in the modern textbooks and treatises on History of Philosophy and Philosophy of Science, both 
Italian
1
 and foreign, there exist neither a whole chapter nor few sections, devoted to the fundamental 
epistemological work of Federigo Enriques, whose philosophical thought is dismissed in few lines among the 
subjects related to the modern Italian Philosophy between the end of the 19th-Century and the beginning of 
the 20th- one. Make an exception both some prefaces to the various anastatic reprints of the Federigo 
Enriques works and some remarkable collective and proceeding works mainly edited by the Centro Studi 
Federigo Enriques in Livorno (IT). All that is quite unfair respect to the wide cleverness and acuteness of the 
forerunner Enriques’ thought: he has been remembered only for his high and celebrated contributions to 
Algebraic Geometry, and only recently a certain further attention has appeared towards this author
2
. 
  An almost same fate has been undergone by Giovanni Vailati, almost to witness that absurd but real (and 
still effective) kind of reciprocal dislike, by both sides, between philosophers and scientists, which embed its 
historical roots into the secular dispute between Geisteswissenschaften on the one hand, and the 
Naturwissenschaften on the other hand
3
. Historically, many renowned scholars have tried to settle such a 
dispute, but with very poor results, despite of the immemorial historical course of the scientific culture; in 
Italy then this problematic situation has been (and still is) much more incisive than abroad, above all after the 
famous strong disagreement which has had as main protagonists the neo-Hegelian idealistic philosophers 
(amongst to which G. Gentile and B. Croce) against the neo-positivist ones (amongst to which A. Aliotta, R. 
Ardigò and U. Spirito). 
  Federigo Enriques (1871-1946) was one the main Italian scientists, near to the exponents of the logic 
positivism and of the neo-rationalism, who tried (unfortunately, in vain) to overcome this useless gap 
between the ones and the others. Just (but not exclusively) on particular aspects of this last wholehearted 
attempt of reconciliation and the underlying philosophical motivations, it is based this brief note.  
2. Enriques and the Italian philosophy of the time 
 
In what follows, we mainly consider the few lines written by Ludovico Geymonat (1908-1991) in 
(Geymonat, 1976, Volume VII, Capitolo XI and Volume VIII, Capitolo III) who was one of the main 
exponents of the Italian neo-positivistic current of the 20th-Century, on the wake left by his predecessors, 
amongst to which the same Enriques.  
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 For instance, Ludovico Geymonat, in his celebrated treatise on history of philosophic and scientific thought, devotes a 
whole chapter to the life and work of Gaston Bachelard but not to those of Federigo Enriques, this resulting to be even 
more strange because of the fact that the same Geymonat has been a supporter and a follower of the Enriques work. 
Moreover, this author devotes sections of his treatise to G. Vailati and even to G. Gentile and B. Croce (see (Geymonat, 
1976, Volume VII, Capitolo XI), but not to Enriques, who is mentioned here and there in few lines in such a chapter. 
Likewise for the Nicola Abbagnano treatise. 
2
 See, above all, the works of Mario Castellana quoted in References. 
3
 See (Dalla Chiara & Toraldo di Francia, 1999, Capitolo 15, § 15.1) and (von Weizsäcker, 1994, Capitolo V, § 6.B). 
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The main fact that immediately jumps out to the attention is related to the known difficult relationships 
between the Italian philosophy and the scientific context of the time
4
, whose main causes should, yep, be 
ascribed to the Croce and Gentile
5
 neo-idealism but it wouldn’t be historically correct neglecting certain 
other  antecedent facts concerning such relationships: indeed, some of the main exponents of the same Italian 
neo-positivism of the end of 19th-Century, amongst to which R. Ardigò, did not give the right relevance that 
will deserve the fundamental epistemological works made, for instance, by Vailati, Peano and Beltrami as 
concern the foundations of mathematics. Amongst to them, above Giovanni Vailati (1863-1909) tried to stem 
this incipient breaking between the Italian philosophers toward the scientific philosophy, having as reference 
point the recent work and thought manifested by Federigo Enriques since the last years of the 19th-Century, 
who, after the premature died of Vailati, continued himself, in first person, to bring forward this program of 
reciprocal collaboration. As known, unfortunately both valuable aims, not only intentionally manifested but 
also put in practice with remarkable works
6
, failed with the eclipsing of the anti-idealistic philosophical 
trends and with all the consequent harmful results still today present into the Italian cultural setting. Almost 
like a sort of unfair retaliation of the destiny against these benevolent reconciliation and collaborative 
attempts, to confirmation of the Saint Bernard of Clairvaux maxim according to which «the good intentions 
pave the hell’s roads», Enriques and Vailati were almost neglected by the same Italian culture as regard their 
philosophical works; only abroad they received major attention, again to confirmation of another Latin 
maxim according to which «nemo propheta in patria est
7
». 
  Nevertheless, the appreciated collaborative and open perspectives by Enriques, had remarkable parallel 
attempts in some foreign notable thinkers, among to which Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962) and Hermann  
Weyl (1855-1955), of which herein we wish to point out certain common aspects of their thought
8
. 
 
3. Enriques, Bachelard and Weyl: some comparative attempts 
 
As already said above and as recalls Geymonat in (Geymonat, 1976, Volume VIII, Capitolo III), the causes 
of the failure of the Enriques philosophical program (with the consequent neglect of the related thought)  
must not be imputed only to his controversy with Croce and Gentile, albeit it played a pivotal role, but also 
to the same mathematical community of the time and its own ‘internal behavioural deontological codex’ 
according to which was seen with extreme diffidence every attempt turned toward historical, philosophical 
and foundational (above all logical) questions: it is very strange as such a mental crease be still present, as a 
kind of internal pure idealism, into the mathematical sciences, being understood, also nowadays, as totally 
detached to any type of problematic which did not be of a purely theoretical nature or, at most, technical-
applicative. After an initial good consideration, Enriques was yet soon isolated both by the Italian 
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 For a brief outlines concerning the relationships between Mathematics and Philosophy at the beginning of the 20th-
Century, see also (Berzolari, 1978, Articolo LXI, § 4), where, amongst other, there is a rich related literature. 
5
 Just as regards Giovanni Gentile, it is notable to recall as his son Giovannino Gentile Jr. (1906-1942) was a great 
physicist prematurely died: for some brief biobibliographical notes on him, see (Bernardini & Bonolis, 2002) and 
(Bernardini, 2007), from which emerges that, after all, the same Giovanni Gentile senior wasn’t so adverse to the 
scientific knowledge as could seem at a first sight, leaving full freedom to the studies of his son, even eulogizing, also 
publicly (see (Gentile, 1941)), the natural sciences and its Galileian experimental method. Instead, it was above all 
Croce the main opponent of the scientific knowledge, very likely to counteract a possible advent of the neo-positivistic 
thought headed mainly by the so-called Vienna Circle (but also by the Berliner Gesellschaft für Wissenschaftliche 
Philosophie of H. Reichenbach, near to the former) to whom Enriques was into relation, strong of position conquered 
by this last within the Italian Philosophical Society. On the other hand, after the died of his son, Gentile senior also 
published a book entitled Scritti minori (di scienza, filosofia e letteratura) which collect all the publications of his son, 
from which, besides, it clearly emerges an extraordinary eclecticism of Gentile junior quite similar to that of Enriques, 
even in the undergone fait: indeed, the same Gentile junior was also discriminated, both by scientists and humanists, for 
his attempts to unify humanistic framework with the scientific one; only Giovanni Polvani and Ettore Majorana were 
estimators of his singular work, Ettore Majorana having also been a his strict friend (which is quite strange seen his 
character). 
6
 In particular, the important works I problemi della scienza (1906) and Scienza e razionalismo (1912), despite had been 
criticized first by Gentile then by Croce, earned to Enriques, for some years, the presidency of the same Italian 
Philosophical Society. The journal Scientia, Rivista di sintesi scientifica, founded in 1907, was the result of the great 
foresight of Enriques, established just what place of meeting and cultural exchange between philosophers and scientists. 
7
 And this maxim reached its highest achievement just relatively to the fate of the journal Scientia, whose initial 
programmatic manifesto was formed by the celebrated book I problemi della scienza (1906). 
8
 For other aspects, we refer to (Redondi, 1978). 
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philosophical society and (mainly for these his first interests) by the same mathematical community which 
was completely unrelated to these type of studies, a human fate this which was also experienced by 
Bachelard (see (Geymonat, 1976, Capitolo X, § II)). 
  Enriques was just one of the few ones to try changing this unilateral perspective into the Italian context. In 
this framework, we want to consider what was the same situation abroad, limiting ourselves to few authors. 
In France, the general aversion towards the Logic found an influential supporter in Poincaré that opposed the 
initiative of the logician Louis Couturat to introduce the Peano and Russell ideas in his country, 
notwithstanding Poincaré himself was one of the greatest French scholar of Epistemology and Philosophy of 
Science, together to P. Duhem, the latter also a strenuous opponent of the Logicism. Both did themselves 
paladins of an antidogmatic conception of the science, involving a certain convenctionalism, whose ideas 
were retaken by their successors as L. Brunscvicg, É. Meyerson, A. Rey and A. Koyré, till to Gaston 
Bachelard who is considered as the most original thinker in this type of studies. For shortness, we refer also 
to (Abbagnano, 1995, Capitolo XI, § 799) for exposing the main outlines of Bachelard thought.  
  With a license both in Mathematics and in Philosophy, but first of all historian of science, Bachelard have 
drawn inspiration sources from his scientific researches for his further epistemological reflection, which yet 
is different from the neo-positivistic one for a major historicization of the scientific thought, this last being 
also connected with the various historical, technical, social, cultural and psychological data in which it has 
evolved. He considers philosophy and science inseparably connected among them,  and existing not an only 
one science but different sciences or an irreducible plurality of knowledge and specific techniques, speaking 
of an applied rationalism, which is very close to the Enriques experimental and critical rationalisms (see 
(Redondi, 1978, Capitolo V, Footnote 
43
) and (Castellana, 1974)). Both these philosophical trends were 
substantially motivated by their common interests for physical questions and connected relationships with 
the mathematics, which, among other things, were also taken as valid and useful educational tool for exact 
sciences (see (Castelnuovo, 1907)), in particular for mathematics itself; furthermore, both were quite adverse 
to the idealistic theses despite of they always tried to classify and to compare their studies in the more 
general framework of the great philosophical systems
9
.  
  Nevertheless, this closeness between their rationalisms does not completely extend to their respective 
conception and role played by the history of science, that in Enriques coincides with the history of 
philosophy and goes on from past to future in a continuous manner (see (Enriques, 1938)), whereas in 
Bacherlard, even if science and philosophy are inseparably connected between them (like in Enriques), 
nevertheless the history of science is guided only by the current rational values and only minimally is 
influenced by the past because of discontinuities due to the occurrence of certain breakings
10
 (see later). 
Instead, a common point in their conception of the history of science methodology is findable in certain 
psychologistic tendencies of both authors: for instance, Enriques, in (Enriques, 1938), states that the study of 
the historic-phenomenological evolution of scientific ideas may turn out to be useful to understand the 
genesis of the same scientific ideas, from which emerges the necessary inseparable co presence both of 
rational and empirical factor in the birth and development of it (see (Geymonat, 1976, Volume VIII, Capitolo 
III, § II)). This last perspective is also considered – hence in agreement too with Enriques – both by 
Bachelard
11
 (see (Geymonat, 1976, Volume VII, Capitolo, X, § III) and by Weyl in (Weyl, 1949, Capitolo 5, 
§ 21) where the latter argues on the formation of scientific theories, reporting the Enriques conception of the 
continuous epistemic role played by the history of science in the formation of itself; a fundamental tool to 
pursue this common Bachelard, Enriques and Weyl standpoint being just the history of science intended not 
as erudite research but as a dynamic and active research of the scientific spirit considered along its 
diachronic and synchronic development
12
.  
  According to Bachelard, the scientific progress, instead, does not take place through a continuous and 
unilateral process but by means of epistemological breakings respect to the previous theoretical schemes, 
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 For instance, Bachelard, in his conception of philosophy respect to the epistemology and the science, outlines a 
philosophical topology in which to place the various historical philosophical systems and respect to which comparing 
the same historical evolution of science (see (Geymonta, 1976, Volume VII, Capitolo X, § V)); in this, Bachelard and 
Enriques are very close.  
10
 In this sense, anticipating the T.S. Kuhn thought about scientific revolutions. 
11
 Under a certain Husserlian influence. 
12
 Even if these authors give a different weight just to these two basic aspects of the historical evolution: for instance, 
Enriques gives much more importance to the diachronic aspects, whereas Bachelard give more attention to the 
synchronic ones. 
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which, in turn, may take place only overcoming the various epistemological obstacles
13
 that hinder the 
science path. Nevertheless, Bachelard inherited some of the main themes common to his predecessors, above 
all Poincaré and Duhem, like the aversion to the logic, the antiempiricism (differently by Enriques), the 
tendency to link the critics of science with its history, the essential originary creative nature of the theories, 
and so on. In particular, his contrariness to the logicism and formalism of Peano, Russell and Hilbert, puts 
him on a same level respect to Enriques who was notoriously into very cold relationships with Peano as 
noted by Mario Castellana in (Castellana, 1973) – who, inter alia, has also made fundamental 
epistemological studies just on the authors here considered: see (Castellana, 2004), (Castellana, 2005) and 
(Castellana, 2010), in which a more in-depth comparative historic-epistemological analysis of these authors 
is made.  
  Contrarily to his teacher Brunschvicg who considered the mathematics as a simple language tool, Bachelard 
instead claims as the mathematics is the pillar of discovery which creates the modern physical science, in 
opposition to the so-called ‘doctrinaires of axiomatic’ like Hilbert. According to Bachelard (see (Geymonat, 
1976, Volume VII, Capitolo X, § III)), every formal thought is an incomplete psychological exemplification 
since it is a kind of never reached limit-thought, a thought around a some subject, concerning hidden images, 
which will be auxiliary to build up the related formal framework; the mathematics of the new physics is fed 
by its own experimental applications, whereas the science, in its educational aspects (to which Bachelard 
devotes much attention), cannot be exposed in its direct axiomatic form (against the later Bourbakism) but it 
should first be exposed for being understood, upon which thereafter building up its rigorous theoretical 
framework. To this purpose, according to Bachelard, the mathematics should be taught with an applicative 
method oriented toward the sciences, like physics and chemistry, hence together these. From all that, it is 
evident the common points with the related Enriques thought, which was notoriously opposed to any form of 
strict and curt formalism as well as favourable to this educational way of teaching.  
  On the other hand, the Enriques’ aversion to logicism is clearly identifiable in some of his fundamental 
works on Algebraic Geometry: indeed, taking into account the introduction
14
 of Guido Castelnuovo – who 
was one of the closer collaborator of Enriques and, in turn, himself clever mathematician – to the 
posthumous publication of the first 1942 edition of the basic work (Enriques, 1949), it is possible to glimpse 
what practical conception of the mathematics had Enriques. From that, Castelnuovo also expresses a his own 
worry as concerns the new course undertaken by the mathematics of the 20th-Century beginning, quite 
different from that intuitive and imaginative characterizing the very fruitful and advantageous 19th-Century 
mathematical thought. Instead, on the basis of Enriques work, Castelnuovo argues on the new way of doing 
mathematics in the first half of the 20th-Century, more turns toward the technical and logical aspects rather 
than sight, at first, the general framework of the mathematical question on which only subsequently building 
up the theory; this is compared too with an analogous situation which was taking place in the artistic context, 
where even there the imagination and fantasy were dismissed and pejoratively considered as arising from the 
romantic era, giving instead more consideration to the technical and tool aspects. From all that, it is evident 
why Enriques did not appreciate the logicistic way of doing mathematics that has gradually taken place ever 
more, trying to find confirmations to his way of seeing mathematics into the philosophical context, reaching 
to very original and interesting, innovative explanatory modes concerning a mathematical reasoning.  
  The intuitive and imagination view in mathematics was that mainly adopted and then carried out by the 
great mathematicians of the 19th-Century, as Gauss, Riemann, Abel, Jacoby, Poincaré and others, and for 
make the idea of that, we herein report the exact Castelnuovo textual words, which we surely may consider 
reflecting what Enriques himself believed in this regards 
 
«La fantasia, la intuizione che guidavano la ricerca di allora sono oggi guardate con sospetto per il 
terrore degli errori a cui possono condurre. Le teorie sorgevano per rispondere al bisogno che il 
matematico provava di delineare e precisare degli oggetti del pensiero che erano già, in forma vaga, 
presenti alla sua mente. Era l’esplorazione di un ampio territorio intravisto da una cima lontana. Si 
costruirono così nel secolo scorso quei gioielli che si chiamano teoria delle funzioni analitiche, delle 
funzioni ellittiche, abeliane, superficie ad area minima, superficie cubiche… Oggi più che il terreno 
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 Besides, to explain their occurrence, Bachelard appeal, amongst other, to the Freudian and Jungian psychoanalytic 
theories as well as to the Husserlian phenomenology. The epistemological obstacle theory led thereafter Bachelard to 
his Philosophy of No.  
14
 See (Enriques, 1949, pp. V-VIII). 
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da esplorare interessa la via che vi conduce, e questa via ora vien seminata di ostacoli artificiali, ora 
si libra tra le nuvole». 
 
As the same Poincaré said in his celebrated work (Poincaré, 1905), a mathematical construction is 
necessarily composed first by an intuitive process, which discovers, then by a logic process, which proves, 
coherently with what Enriques says just above through the Castelnuovo report. Hence, Enriques philosophy 
of mathematical thought as mainly based first on intuition – and which is common to almost all the 
celebrated exponents of the Italian algebraic geometry school of the time (among to which E. Beltrami, L. 
Cremona, F. Severi, E. Castelnuovo, C. Segre, B. Segre, G. Veronese, G. Fano and others) – is in accordance 
with the Poincaré thought
15
 as well as with that of Riemann whose geometric perspective was, amongst 
other, one of the main common point of the thought of Bachelard, Enriques and Weyl, as witnessed by 
(Castellana, 2004) and
16
 (Redondi, 1978). Furthermore, Enriques, Bachelard and Poincaré were also joined 
by the common constant doing reference to the psychological sciences, but not in a reductive way; in this 
regards, the work of Enriques was abundant of suggestions for the subsequent works of Jean Piaget and 
Pierre Gonseth
17
 in epistemology, while the Poincaré philosophical legacy will be, for instance, later retaken 
by J. Hadamard in his celebrated work (Hadamard, 1945).   
  From this, it is easy to find interesting historical connections between the Enriques ideas and the work of 
another as much great mathematician, Hermann Weyl. Both were two among the greatest mathematicians of 
history whose work on pure and applied mathematics allowed them to be able to understand the various 
aspects of a mathematical reasoning, so that their thought should be taken into great account. As regards 
Weyl’s thought on the nature of mathematical reasoning, it is enough to recall18 as, according to him, in the 
edification of a mathematical theory, the general starting point is represented by what he calls an operative 
framework (Operationsbereich), formed by the choice of a number of fundamental categories of entities 
respect to which are given certain properties and relations, from which, then, to go on for building up the 
whole theoretical system through the creative iterative application of certain generative processes which 
include two main types, the logic process and the mathematical process: the former generate new properties 
and relations (said derived) starting from an initial stock of primitive relations and properties related to the 
entities of certain initial categories, applying the common usual elementary logical operations
19
; the latter, 
instead, allows to constitute new ideal entities from a given system of properties and relations related to 
certain entities already known, identifying a class of entities including only those having such properties. 
Subsequently, Weyl himself, in his celebrated work (Weyl, 1949, Capitolo 1), represents the same distinction 
between logic and mathematical process by means of the distinction between combinatorial and creative 
definition, the combinatorial one being legitimated by the logic process, whereas the creative one is that 
legitimated by the mathematical process. The creative iteration of these two inseparable processes lead to the 
notions of types and orders through the so-called expanded and limited processes. 
  The Weyl philosophical thought, relatively to the properly mathematical context, has evolved in time from 
the first work Das Kontinuum (1918) to the final Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science (1949) 
which is a revised and enlarged edition of a first German 1926 paper published in the Handbuch der 
Philosophie and that recently it has been republished in a new 2009 edition with an introduction by the 
Physics Nobel laureate A.F. Wilczek regarding the parts more properly physical of this Weylian work. We 
here does not wish to discuss the Weyl philosophical positions and their evolution, but point out only few of 
their aspects which may be quite close to the Enriques ones. First, both thinkers belonged to the very restrict 
class of pure scientists which could not do without to consider also the philosophical questions inherent a 
given mathematical or scientific problem, like Poincaré, Riemann, Einstein, Eddington, Mach, Russell and 
few other scientists of 19th- and 20th-Century, cultural tradition, this, that will go ever more to disappear
20
. 
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 As known, after Poincaré, in France the logicism and formalism currents attained their highest height with the 
Boubakism, prevailing educational address until few years ago. In this regards, Vladimir I. Arnold, which may be 
considered as a great intuitive mathematician, was very critical on this, trying to reintroduce many mathematical 
textbooks oriented towards the intuitive and imaginary way of doing mathematics (from a PhD Seminar lesson held by 
Prof. Giorgio Bolondi). 
16
 To which we refer for a more careful study. 
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 See Sections 1 and 2 of the introductory survey by O. Pompeo Faracovi to the Italian edition of (Enriques, 1938). 
Moreover, about the relationships among Enriques, Bachelard and Gonseth, see above all (Castellana, 2005). 
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 In what follows, we refer to (Casari, 1972, Capitolo XIII, § 1). 
19
 And therefore characterized by a low degree of creativity, differently from the mathematical one. 
20
 Today being almost inexistent. 
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In particular, Weyl himself, in the Preface to (Weyl, 1949), states as it has been no possible to him leave 
aside from philosophical questions each time that the opportunity will arose, ever trying to put the given 
mathematical or physical question into comparison with the suitable known philosophical frameworks; on 
the other hand, it is never enough the importance given to the philosophical thought in motivating and 
stimulating the same mathematical or scientific production, in this case being sufficient to recall the 
Riemann
21
 and Einstein ideas history. Furthermore, from every part of his book, it gives rise the Weylian 
idea according to which there is almost always a prevalence of the imaginative components for the 
occurrence of a mathematical insight (either it concerns a proof or the institution of a new formal object). 
Moreover, taking also into account the physical science
22
, in the work (Weyl, 1932) the author explains the 
so-called essence of the new scientific mind turned towards the contemplation of a pluralistic and dynamic 
open world put into not aggressive but sympathetic relationships with the religious spirit: in this regards, 
Weyl devotes the first chapter of his work, entitled God and the Universe, to discuss just these last aspects, 
trying to justify the apparent contrasts which can arise if this argument is carried out by a mathematician; 
and, on the other hand, this type of extreme and romantic philosophical digressions weren’t estrange to the 
same Enriques which, in this regards, so he expresses himself at the end of his celebrated work (Enriques, 
1949, Capitolo XI, § 9) 
 
«A questo punto ci sia consentito fermarci un istante, come in un’ascensione alpina si ama sostare sul 
picco conseguito e di là contemplare lo spettacolo della Natura che si offre alla vista.  
  Cinquant’anni or sono s’iniziava in Italia lo studio di queste teorie [delle superfici algebriche], 
appena abbozzate dal genio di un precursore (Max Noether); allora, scherzando sulle difficoltà e le 
eccezioni che s’incontravano da ogni parte, si soleva dire che, mentre le curve algebriche (già 
composte in una teoria armonica) sono create da Dio, le superficie invece sono opera del Demonio
23
. 
  Ora si palesa invece che piacque a Dio di creare per le superficie un ordine di armonie più riposte 
ove rifulge una meravigliosa bellezza, e ch’Ei volle in esse – diciamo col Poeta –  
 
del creator suo spirito 
più vasta orma stampar. 
 
La ricchezza delle proprietà e la bellezza, lungamente nascosta, che qui si palesano, non debbono 
costituire ragione di vano orgoglio per la scuola geometrica italiana o per i geometri stranieri che 
hanno collaborato a scoprirle, ma piuttosto debbono suscitare un senso di reverenza per quell’ordine 
meraviglioso degli enti matematici, che il pensiero trova innanzi a sé e quasi raccoglie, al pari delle 
specie viventi, dalla Natura Madre; e così alimentare la fede dei giovani ricercatori che dietro alle 
difficoltà, alle eccezioni, alle apparenti incongruenze, c’è realmente in questo mondo di enti, una 
divina armonia, che gli sforzi concordi degli studiosi riusciranno sempre meglio a mettere in luce». 
 
The treatise (Enriques, 1949), as recalls the same Castelnuovo, was, amongst others, the most important 
work of Enriques devoted to Algebraic Geometry, began just after he was graduated from Scuola Normale 
Superiore of Pisa till to the last years of his life, ever in continuous remaking and revision. However, the 
main feature of the whole book is just the intuitive and imaginative method in treating geometrical questions 
therein introduced, but that led himself to undergo various criticisms as regards the proof correctness of 
certain theorems notwithstanding the importance of the achieved results. This peculiar way of doing 
mathematics is characteristic of that unique kind of scientific-humanistic current which Enriques wanted to 
pursue and that was partially retaken and kept alive by very few of some of his pupils, amongst to which 
above all Ludovico Geymonat, Attilio Frajese (1902-1986), Luigi Campedelli (1903-1978) and Lucio 
Lombardo-Radice (1916-1982): the latter, in his preface to the anastatic reprint of (Enriques, 1938), 
remembers some of these distinguishing Enriques features first of all his attempt to overcome the reductive 
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 In particular, as regards Riemann, it is enough to recall the basic notable influence exerted on his scientific production 
by the thought of the anti-idealist German philosopher J.F. Herbart (1776-1841) and of G.Th. Fechner (1801-1887) (see 
the Introduction by R. Pettoello to (Riemann, 1994)). 
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 And the constant and repeated attention to these is also a further common point of the Weyl and Enriques thought. 
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 In this regards, it circulates too another similar maxim but concerning the integer and complex numbers, in part 
included in that due to L. Kronecker according to which «the integer numbers are due to the God action, everything 
else being due to the human one»; the addendum, according to which yet «the complex numbers are due to the Devil 
action», seems instead to be anonymous.  
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barrier, or fence, between the Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften, gap this which was inexistent 
in him since the beginning of his juvenile studies; the link between philosophical and exact sciences was of 
an indissoluble and mutual character in Enriques training who was hostile to any form of extreme 
specialization, nourishing a sense of circular unity of the knowledge, mastering a great quantity of cognitions 
in many fields of knowledge but without never becoming a specialist (with an exception for Algebraic 
Geometry). Maybe, just for this he undergone the unhappy fate of the beaten and lonely scientist, like 
Bachelard, even if such a condition did not weight on his spiritual serenity which characterized almost the 
whole of his life.  
  In short, there existed notable scientists, like Weyl and Enriques (and, in part, also Bachelard if one takes 
into account his curriculum vitӕ and studiorum), for which their pure scientific work couldn’t be disjoined 
by the philosophical speculation: for them, it is valid what says the same Weyl, namely that there exist men 
like artists, scientists, technologists or politicians which devote themselves to the construction, whereas 
instead others devote themselves to the reflection and to the philosophical speculation; the one and the other 
work should actively integrate among them otherwise the creativity loses itself into the mechanicalness of 
pure routine, while the reflection becomes abstract and void natter.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The intuitive and imaginative manner to approach, in a first phase, an arbitrary mathematical question as 
understood above all by Enriques and Weyl, but also by Bachelard on the wake left by Poincaré via 
Brunschvicg (see (Geymonat, 1976, Volume VII, Capitolo X, § III)), might have non-negligible implications 
from an educational perspectives if one considers the mathematics like an immanent order of the Nature or 
an intelligible reality external to our mind (like Plato), revoking the medieval realists against the nominalists; 
in this regards, according to Enriques and Castelnuovo (see his basic, but little known, paper (Castelnuovo, 
1907)), the methodology of Physics might playing a fundamental educational role also from a mathematical 
viewpoint, above all in Geometry
24
. 
  They surely belong to the so-called visual mathematicians rather than the abstract ones, above all Enriques 
that applied this mathematical philosophy to the active geometrical research field of the time, reaching to 
valuable results: the work (Enriques, 1949) is considered as an unique, valuable source of mathematical ideas 
as concerns the algebraic geometry of surfaces, although it were found many proofs little correct from a pure 
formal viewpoint and that the same author tried to remedy with a continuous revision of his work, but 
substantially without changing its remarkable content of ideas. The same Castelnuovo, in the introduction to  
(Enriques, 1949), affirms as Enriques was forced to improve his work because of certain criticisms moved by 
formalists only to the proofs of some of his theorems. On the other hand, it was well-known, and the same 
Castelnuovo and Enriques were aware of this, in what state was the theory of algebraic surface at that time, 
hoping in a future improvement of it from a formal viewpoint
25
. 
  In short, from what has been so far, it clearly emerges as almost every creative mathematical process 
necessarily first should start with an intuitive and imaginative approach which could, in the eventuality, to be 
corrected or improved by a subsequently formal or abstract revision phase which, in turn, might to provide 
further results susceptible of possible further physical interpretations (like the discovery of antimatter 
expected by the physical interpretation of the eigenvalue problem solutions of electron Dirac’s relativistic 
equation deduced from a formal relativistic extension of the Schrödinger equation). In particular, the main 
theses on the real nature of mathematics by Enriques, come just from the geometric context, that is to say, 
the Geometry is the main epistemological paradigm for a neo-Platonic conception of mathematics: among 
the contemporary thinkers which agree with such an Enriques view, we recall H. Freudenthal – that, among 
other things, has tried to apply this program to the educational context
26
 – and R. Thom (which acquires the 
                                                          
24
 As regards the experimental character of mathematics, see also the brief but important note of Jean Leray in 
(Hamburger, 1986). 
25
 Which, besides, couldn’t take place without these initial results. However, this intuitive way of working was common 
among the above mentioned exponents of the so-called Italian geometric school (in part, following that of the German 
tradition dating back to Riemann, Klein and von Helmholtz), which yet attained to original and remarkable results in the 
geometry field. Only subsequently many other mathematicians, above all not Italians, improved their results from a 
formal and abstract viewpoint, often arguing against such a School, in particular towards Enriques; among them, it is 
not possible omit the name of Oscar Zariski, who scientifically growth just within this celebrated school. 
26
 Furthermore, the names of H. von Helmholtz and H. Freudenthal are also historically related to some important 
problems concerning the axiomatic characterization of the so-called Physical Geometry, an important field of studies 
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related Poincaré ideas legacy). All this is coherent (and prodomal) with the modern cognitive science 
researches according to which at the basis of the mathematical thought fundamentally there are visual-spatial 
skills. In any way, nowadays it is almost inexistent this type of reciprocal useful and fruitful relationships 
between Mathematics, History and Philosophy which might also be useful from an educational standpoint
27
. 
  Hence, in conclusion, by Poincaré, on the French side, and by Riemann, Klein and von Helmholtz, on the 
German side, Enriques picks up these influences, coeval respectively to the Bachelard and Weyl ideas, to 
originally develops his thought towards an intuitive view of mathematics – and applying it to his pioneering 
geometrical researches – which will reach its highest value with the L.E.J. Brouwer intuitionism28, does not 
never neglecting the related philosophical counterpart: so, this is just the leitmotiv that has led the drawing up 
of this brief note. In our simple opinion, the historical considerations so far done might have some 
educational implications both for natural sciences and mathematics. 
 
Remark. In this paper, we have limited ourselves to point out those points of Bachelard, Enriques and Weyl 
thought which overall lead, amongst other, to the revaluation of that line of thought referring to the visual 
and intuitive conception of mathematics dating back to Plato and Socrates. Between Bachelard and Enriques, 
via Poincaré, we have tried to identify some common points more oriented toward the philosophy and history 
of science than toward the relationships between mathematics and physics which yet are also present. 
Instead, as regard Enriques and Weyl, we have put more attention to these last type of basic relationships, as 
well as the relationships between philosophy and science, the historical questions being strongly present 
more into the Enriques thought than the Weyl one. 
  For other as much interesting common points among the mathematical philosophy thought of these authors, 
we refer to (Redondi, 1978). In particular, we want to stress out what fundamental educational role may 
played the philosophical thought in science, the works of Enriques and Weyl being enough to prove this.    
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